The
Dolejsi Analysis (1991)
Part
Two of Four
By
Miroslav Dolejsi
Translated
by Jan Malina
Part
2, The November 1989 Revolution
The Czechoslovak
Parliamentary Investigative Committee's report on developments surrounding the
November 17, 1989 Revolution was classified and not released to the public. The
investigation resulted in the sentencing of a handful of insignificant police
officers to a few months of jail time. The investigation focused on brutalities
committed on National Boulevard [in Prague].
The investigators carefully avoided any mention of the political
background of the revolution. The independent student investigative committee
created in response to the manipulations of the parliament was sidestepped.
[Note: The West understands the 1989 Revolution as an “anti-communist”
revolt triggered by police brutality on November 17.]
The aftermath of
these developments was widespread doubt regarding the nonsense legend of the
“Velvet Revolution.” This nonsense is still being preached by President
Havel and by the Charter 77 government. President Havel did not fulfill his
publicly given promise that all files about meetings between Havel’s group
[Charter 77] and the communist government of Prime Minister Adamec, followed by
meetings with “the decisive political powers,” would be published. In the
time frame of a few months it became obvious that the brutal police response on
National Boulevard was prepared in advance and was meant as a signal for
starting the revolution.
After the signal
was given the initiative passed to Charter 77. This indicates there was
coordination between the communists and Charter 77 in preparing the
revolutionary process. Immediately after the brutality occurred Charter 77 took
matters into its own hands by spreading a rumor [later proved false] through
student Drazska that student Smid was killed [by the police]. This inexplicable
transfer of initiative is a political mystery. It suggests a point of connection
between Charter 77 and a special faction of the Central Committee of the CzCP
[Czechoslovak Communist Party].
Taking into consideration the doubts of the Czechoslovak people, the BBC
shot a documentary about the November 17 episode in which the revolution was
depicted as an unsuccessful Communist Party coup intended to remove Milos Jakes
from the leadership, but the coup got out of hand. [Jakes was General Secretary
of the CzCP at the time.]
Guided by the light
of this interpretation, founding Charter 77 member Jiri Ruml came up with a
proposal to reinvestigate the November 17, 1989 events. This was problematic
because Charter 77 insiders conducted the investigation and presented the BBC
documentary’s interpretation of the “Velvet Revolution” as accurate. This
version of events was politically acceptable because it effectively covered up
any connection between Charter 77 and the communists. The Charter 77 elite could
still be regarded as something it is not [i.e., a genuine anti-communist
movement].
If the truth of
about the November 1989 Revolution were known, Havel and his Charter 77
government would have to fall. That is not acceptable to the foreign [socialist]
sponsors of Charter 77 who were building it up for 13 years and had no
replacement organization acceptable to the Russians. The government of Havel’s
Charter 77 had to be defended and preserved.
From this analysis
it is possible to present facts, putting them into chronological order, showing
the following sequence: After President-elect George H.W. Bush’s advisor, John
Whitehead, visited Eastern Europe in the fall of 1988, preparations for the
changes were begun. In Czechoslovakia a directive was issued for Charter 77 to
step out and create a number of independent groups called “independent
actors.” These included:
SPUSA
[Society of Friends of USA]
HOS [Movement for Citizens Freedom]
DI [Democratic Initiative]
Revival of Socialism [union of former communists and secret police STB
agents of 1968]
Czech Children [monarchists]
NMS [Independent Peace Alliance] and others.
All these groups
worked under the leadership of Charter 77. The objective was to create the
impression of larger-scale anti-communist opposition even though it was a false
impression but necessary for a propaganda campaign aimed at the West. [The
Revival of Socialism group consisted of communists and STB agents from the
Prague Spring era of 1968. These were supposed “liberal” communists like
Dubcek and Cernik.]
In the Central
Committee of the CzCP there was a group set up (which included Urbanek and
Mohorita) under the direction Hegenbart to handle meetings with the Revival of
Socialism group. The objective was to coordinate the removal of CzCP Secretary
General Milos Jakes, by compromising him and getting him out of the way. In
his activities Hegenbart was under orders from the KGB.
There was an
amateur documentary film produced that compromised Jakes by showing him in his
public appearance in West Bohemia. The KGB produced many copies of this film and
sold it abroad. At the same time, Hegenbart was isolating Jakes, who was not
briefed about these changes so any un-desirable response [from the communists]
would've been eliminated at the beginning of the operation.
Hegenbart was also
the main person who in July and August of 1989 directed the communist
government's position toward the exodus of East Germans from the West German
Embassy in Prague to West Germany. In terms of co-operation between
Hegenbart and the Revival of Socialism group, Jiri Hajek [Charter 77 founding
member] traveled to Austria just before the revolution to discuss some last
minute details about the date and form the revolution would take. [Jiri
Hajek: Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party before WW2; he was
involved in merging this party with communists after the 1948 communist
coup.]
The November 17th
date was chosen as the most preferable because it was the International Day of
Students and this would guarantee an international responses and, additionally,
it was chosen because it was the last available such day with the possibility of
an international response before the Bush-Gorbachev summit in Malta where the
unification of Germany was on the table, requiring the input of the
Czechoslovaks.
The report
published by the Independent Student Investigation Committee explains how the
meeting of Prague's College Council [about the demonstration preparations]
was manipulated regarding the participation of Vasil Mohorita. It is possible to
add following to already known facts about the brutal attacks on National
Boulevard:
A) Approximately
two hours before the protest demonstration of students, led by STB lieutenant
Ludvik Zifcak (alias "student Ruzicka”), all public transportation in the
vicinity of the protest was stopped in both directions. The Public
transportation Company [state run] must have received an order to stop all
traffic at least three hours earlier. At the same time National Boulevard was
cleared [no public allowed].
B) Riot police were
in position in Mikulasska and Konviktska [CZ police headquaters] streets three
hours before the arrival of demonstration to National Boulevard.
C) About an hour
before the demonstration began, all buildings were locked up from Pernstyn to
National Theatre, even though the demonstration wasn't supposed to go that way.
D) Quick response
police unit URNA [comparable to a SWAT team] was ordered to remain at alert
level three [its members were at home with their families but had to be on call]
and received an order at 10:30 AM to report to base; that is, four hours before
the demonstration began. After they arrived to base they were ordered to
standby. After the unit changed into camouflage battle uniforms they were
ordered to wear red berets that are part of the dress uniform. At 11:30 the unit
was transported to Bartolomejska Street station where the members were briefed
[about the operation]. This briefing began at 01:45 PM and was conducted by
three STB officers in civilian clothes, who also directed the unit's operational
response in the vicinity of National Theatre – at the time when the
demonstration began three kilometers away. This police intervention unit was
briefed with large-scale pictures on the operational plan of closing
down the National Theatre and the use of armored carriers with blades. This
unit was instructed that STB officers would show them already marked people from
the demonstration that the unit was to capture and arrest. The URNA
unit is trained for quick response operations and not for ordinary public safety
work. Colonel Becvar, who ordered this special unit into action during the
demonstrations, had to know how this unit was to respond. He also had to know
that using such unit for crowd control was unnecessary and not in accordance
with law and the internal regulationsof the Czechoslovak Federal Interior
Ministry. The URNA unit was only to be used at the times of public endangerment
or against organized, armed resistance. Nothing of a kind was expected to
happen on National Boulevard. Colonel Becvar was promoted to his post by Hegenbart
himself, so it is possible that Becvar didn't issue the “illegal”
order to use URNA on his own. Somewhere in this scandal lies the real reason
Becvar shot himself.
E) During the
afternoon hours the entire leadership of Charter 77 left Prague including
their families. The only people that remained in Prague were Uhl, Benda and
Nemcova. Possibly there was a danger for them being arrested if Hegenbart was
not able to paralyze all counter-measures of the leading members of the Central
Committee of CzCP and the Federal Ministry of Interior – who had no
knowledge of the operation and its true purpose.
These Charter 77 leaders all
returned to Prague on Saturday noon. During that time and throughout Sunday
Hegenbart was once and for all able to remove the danger of a counter-stroke by
the Communist Party Militia that was mobilized by Jakes. The operational
objective of the November 17 provocation was not only to remove Jakes from
power, but also to initiate a tactical retreat of the communists to prepared
positions. This tactical retreat and its hidden mechanism was the subject of
negotiations between [Moscow’s handpicked] communist leaders and the Revival
Socialism group, beginning in January 1989. At that time Hegenbart began
mobilizing actors, musicians and others to petition for the release of Havel
from jail. All the initiators of the revolution were communists or agents of
the secret police.
From the list of
students who were active in preparing the protest demonstrations and who later
assumed leadership in the student organizations, we find that they were solely
the children of prominent parents. Eighty percent of these students had parents
at senior levels of the CzCP, Federal Ministry of Interior, Foreign Ministry, or
they were general directors in state-owned enterprises, college professors and
so on. The slogans chosen for the protest were already inscribed in June 1989:
“We are not like them,” “We don’t want any violence,” and variations
on the theme. These slogans signaled that no violence would be used against the
communists [a condition of the transfer of power] and further guarantees were
supplied directly by the students and Civic Forum.
Coming
Next Week: Part Three
|
A
Little Bombshell